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Abstract— Blacklists (BLs), also called Domain Name System-
based Blackhole List (DNSBLs) are the databases of known 
internet addresses used by the spammers to send out the spam 
mails. Mail servers use these lists to filter out the e-mails coming 
from different spam sources. In contrary, Whitelists (WLs) are 
the explicit list of senders from whom e-mail can be accepted or 
delivered. Mail Transport Agent (MTA) is usually configured to 
reject, challenge or flag the messages which have been sent from 
the sources listed on one or more DNSBLs and to allow the 
messages from the sources listed on the WLs. In this paper, we 
are demonstrating how the bandwidth (the overall requests and 
responses that need to go over the network) performance is 
improved by using local caches for BLs and WLs. The actual 
sender’s IP addresses are extracted from the e-mail log. These 
are then compared with the list in the local caches to find out if 
they should be accepted or not, before they are checked against 
the global DNSBLs by running ‘DNSBL queries’ (if required). 
Around three quarters of the e-mail sources have been observed 
to be filtered locally through caches with this method. Provision 
of local control over the lists and lower search (filtering) time are 
the other related benefits.   
Keywords – DNSBL, Blacklist, Whitelist, Spam, Cache 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Just a few decades ago, e-mails were very much trusted. It was 
common for MTA's to relay e-mails. Slowly spammers began 
to take advantage and open relay became a nuisance. Today, 
spam along with the e-mail viruses has become a primary 
reason to blacklist someone.  
Spam filters detect and prevent unwanted e-mails from 
entering our mail box. They examine various parts of e-mails 
to determine if they contain spam messages or are sent from 
the spammer machines. Broadly there are two categories of 
spam filtering [20]. Origin or Address based filtering uses 
network information (IP addresses and e-mail addresses); the 
examples being DNSBLs, challenge response etc. Content 
based filtering looks inside the e-mail and examines the 
message content; the examples being Bayesian and rule based 
filters. Content based spam filtering usually has a higher 
success rate (lower false positives) of finding spam and less 
potential for deliberately blocking senders [21].  
Filtering out large amount of spam e-mails, that too from an 
increasingly varying sources, is difficult and time consuming 
without origin-based spam filtering (DNSBLs). In this work, 
we focus on filtering e-mails using the local caches and the  
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DNSBLs. First, actual senders (IP addresses) are extracted 
using a recent e-mail log. These senders are then searched in 
the local caches (list containing IP addresses that are 
whitelisted or blacklisted) to find out if they should be 
accepted by the mail servers or not. Depending on the hits and 
misses in the local caches, they are then sent for a query 
against the external DNSBL server. Senders listed in the 
DNSBL(s) will be added to the BL cache and those not listed 
will make up the WL cache. The caches (where frequently 
accessed data are stored for rapid access) occupy the hard 
drive memory. 
Caching methodology has shown to help reduce the name 
resolution overhead tremendously [1]. Because a significant 
fraction of DNS lookups never receive answers, they can 
adversely affect performances related to latency and 
bandwidth in the e-mail traffic. A study of spam traffic and 
comparison of popular DNSBLs [2] has shown that a very 
high percentage of all DNS queries accounting for DNSBL 
queries. Main motivation for this work comes from the fact 
that we need to reduce these DNSBL queries as much as 
possible, so that the resources used for this purpose, can be 
used more beneficially elsewhere. 
DNSBLs are managed by various groups; each with their 
own focus lists and different policies in regards to how an IP 
address gets on (and off) the list. It is necessary to converge 
these lists because they vary widely in terms of maintaining 
their domains and responding to the queries. More uniform 
database and standard protocols for catching spam sources is a 
necessity now. It is also necessary to make the DNSBLs more 
complete (that contains a reasonable fraction of all spamming 
IP addresses) and responsive (that yields a low time period 
between the start of spamming and time when the spam source 
becomes black listed), to make them more effective [8].  
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Research works pertaining to the spam control have been 
going on actively for more than a decade now; primarily in the 
pursuit of overpowering the spammers or at forcing them into 
a disadvantageous position. Study of spam traffic as a network 
level behavior (say by tracing spam sent to a single domain 
over a period of time) has been helping to keep track of the 
distribution of spam senders (location, IP range) [16].  
Improving the Efficiency of Spam Filtering 
through Cache Architectures 
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One of many spam filtering approaches, challenge response 
system is a program that replies to an e-mail message from an 
unknown sender by subjecting the sender to a test designed to 
differentiate humans from automated senders. It ensures that 
the messages from people can get through and the automated 
mass mailings of spammers will be rejected. Once senders 
have passed the test, they are added to the recipient's WL of 
permitted senders and will not have to prove themselves next 
time they send a message. This method has proven to be 
highly effective but not that practicable because of the 
necessity of a direct human involvement [3]. Other approaches 
like combating the affect of the spam on end-user mailboxes 
[4], lead spammers experience a significant bandwidth 
limitation and additional delay which partly shifts the cost of 
sending the spam back to the spammer’s end. Other sought 
after approaches include moving away from the reactive 
methods into the proactive/preventive measures, to prevent the 
spammers harvesting e-mail addresses.  
Spam is being sent from an increasingly larger set of IP 
addresses [8]. Spammers also are smart enough to be very 
transient and increasingly agile while distributing the spam. 
For combating this, there have been works on the unified 
technology where different types of content based and source 
based filtering are used together [2, 15]. Additional layers of 
filtering are also implemented: ‘adaptive filtering’ being 
integrated with Spamihilator software [5] or filter testing with 
‘greylists’ (temporarily rejected list) at the SMTP connection 
level [6].  
Though extensive filtering helps combat the spam, in the 
downside, it also hampers a free and open flow of 
communication among the network users [7]. Unquestionably, 
there are also harsh consequences to face: blocking of the 
legitimate e-mails and blacklisting senders wrongfully accused 
of spamming.  
 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Basic E-mail System 
In its simplest form (Figure 1) e-mail works in the 
following manner: the originating sender creates an e-mail by 
using his Mail User Agent (MUA), an e-mail client. The 
sender's MUA then transfers the e-mail to a Mail Delivery 
Agent (MDA). MDA routes the e-mail into the local 
mailboxes or forwards it if it is not locally addressed. If the e-
mail is forwarded, MTA, a mail server, uses the Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) to send and receive messages 
between different systems. The e-mail also usually passes 
through different filters before entering the user’s inbox. 
Two different servers are usually running in a mail server 
machine: SMTP (for sending) & Post Office Protocol version 
3 (POP3) and Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) (for 
receiving). All these servers listen to a unique port number for 
any incoming e-mail: SMTP server uses port number 25, 
POP3 uses port 110 and IMAP uses port 143. 
Say, a person with e-mail address one@mailserver1.com is 
sending an e-mail. He uses the services of MUA and the e-
mail client. If the recipient is another user at same mail server, 
two@mailserver1.com, SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol) 
will hand over the mail to POP3 (post office protocol) server 
using MDA. SMTP server breaks e-mail into two parts: 
recipient (one), domain name (mailserver.com) and puts it in 
the message queue. If the recipient is a user of different mail 
server, say, three@mailserver2.com, SMTP contacts DNS 
(Domain Name System) to get the IP address of the receiving 
mail 
 
                                      Fig. 1: Typical E-Mail System 
 
 
Fig.2: Varied Aggressiveness of E-Mail Filtering 
 
server. MTA and SMTP then work together to handover the 
mail to a receiving server. In the receiving side POP3 and 
MDA work to put the message into the inbox. If the MTA 
finds out that an e-mail is blacklisted, it simply flags the 
suspected spam or directly deletes it. 
Figure 2 shows varying aggressiveness of the E-mail 
filtering system. The filtering layers (external DNSBLs, local 
BL, local WL, various kinds of spam filters, virus filters etc) 
can vary in sequence from one mail server to another, with 
some mail servers including more filters than other. This will 
then vary the aggressiveness of the e-mail filtering process. 
The requirement of the number of filters depends on the 
volume of the e-mail traffic and the necessity or preference of 
certain filters more than the others. Most e-mails go through 
the external DNSBL queries and are filtered with the local 
database of BL and pass through the spam filters before or 
after being downloaded into the mail server. E-mail clients 
usually have their own BLs and WLs filter rules.  
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B. Common E-mail Systems and Headers 
Almost every e-mail passes through at least four machines 
during its lifetime. This includes two mail servers and two 
client machines. Say, user1@mail.ucf.edu client wants to send 
an e-mail to user2@myisp.com. “user1” composes e-mail 
which is passed to its mail server (mail.ucf.edu). This mail 
server sees if it is destined for another “mail.ucf.edu” client or 
not; since it is for another mail server, it contacts 
“mailhost.myisp.com” and delivers the e-mail. The e-mail 
remains at this mail server until “user2” connects to the 
internet and opens his mail box. During these events mail 
headers are constantly being added to the user’s message. The 
headers are added specifically, at the composition time (by e-
mail program “user1” is using); the time when the e-mail 
program hands over the message to the mail server 
“mail.ucf.edu” and then at the transfer point from the 
“mail.ucf.edu’ mail server to the “myisp.edu” mail server.  
Some of the fields that are recorded during these 
transactions are: Received, From, To, Date, Message-ID, X-
mailer, Subject etc. Inside each Received field, following 
pieces of information are embedded: from hostname; by host 
name; via physical path; with protocol; id message-ID; for 
final e-mail destination. Different E-mail systems have their 
own styles of received fields and additional information. 
In the following example, user1@mail.ucf.edu (of 
mail.ucf.edu mail server) is sending a message to 
user2@mailhost.myisp.com (of mailhost.myisp.edu mail 
server). If an e-mail passes though an intermediate relay, there 
will be total of at least two received headers like this:  
Received: from intermediate.sender.com 
(some.firewall.com)(xx.xxx.xxx.xxx) by mailhost.myisp.edu 
with SMTP; id 12jh3hk21h3; 16 Nov 2003 19:50:37 -0000 
Received: from mail.ucf.edu [xxx.xx.xx.xx] 
byintermediate.sender.com (server name 1.0) with SMTP id 
34kjdfh3kjh3; Sun, 16 Nov 2006 13:38:22 -0600 
 
As the e-mail travels from one server to another, receiving 
mail server puts ‘Received:’ field on top of the previous 
‘Received:’ field. We trace the path taken by the message by 
traveling up the header. The “by“ (senders) should match with 
the “from” (receivers) in the preceding ‘Received:’ field in 
terms of IP addresses or domain names. For suspect (spam) e-
mails, there usually would be non-matching/forged IP 
addresses or domain names. 
 
C. E-mail Log 
A major source of senders and relays is an e-mail log (e.g. a 
syslog file). Syslog is a standardized logging service that can 
be used on almost any computer platform [13]. It provides the 
breadcrumb trail we need while tracking down the computers 
that sent or relayed the e-mails. Syslog's standard log line is 
formatted as: [date] [time] [system] [tag]: [ID] [message]. The 
date and time sections of this format act as the log message's 
timestamp. The system section specifies which computer sent 
the syslog message. It may show an IP address or a hostname 
(domain name). The tag section tells which application or the 
process generated the message. The message section contains 
additional information of the process that generated the 
message and the text of the message. At times ‘tag’ and 
‘content’ fields are considered to be the parts of the message 
field. A mail server usually processes multiple mail requests at 
a time. Multiple entries from the logs that pertain to the same 
e-mail are combined into a single entry.   
As with the e-mail headers, different log files contain 
different logged information. With some log files, we obtain 
information on various filters and services each e-mail 
(identified by the message ID) has to pass through. Others 
provide information on the status of each e-mail (successfully 
sent, service currently deferred, service unavailable, from 
unknown sender etc). This helps us understand if the message 
has completed its journey from the originator to the recipient’s 
mail box or if the system needs to complete the transfer again. 
The senders, hosts and relays can be identified with the IP 
addresses or the domain names appended to the specific 
strings (from, host, relay). Other log files have a tabularly 
formatted data containing different sections or headers like 
Date, Time, Client-ip, Client-hostname, Server-hostname, 
Server-IP, Recipient-Address, Event-ID, MSGID, Priority, 
Recipient-Report-Status, Total size, Number of Recipients, 
Origination-Time, Encryption service, Version, etc, which 
provide numerous information about the sending and relaying 
machines.  
Spammers often forge the headers of the e-mails to avoid 
losing their accounts and to evade the e-mail filters. They 
insert forged contents in the e-mail headers that would point to 
somebody else as a real sender. As a result, e-mail logs are 
generated that contain false e-mail and IP addresses of the 
senders. With more scrutiny, we also can see a substantial 
time gap (forged sections are often prepared ahead of time), 
and ‘out of place’ routing list (we can trace route of the e-
mail) in the fake e-mail headers and e-mail logs. 
 
D. Blacklist 
The IP addresses that are blacklisted are often those 
(machines) that have been observed by the DNSBL operators 
to be sending spam e-mails, hosting spammers or by policy, 
those that are not allowed to send e-mails directly. The list 
operators actively monitor the internet for reports of e-mail 
traffic from various sources sending the spam and issue their 
list. This list is then used by mail servers, ISPs and 
organizations to block out the spam sources.  
  DNSBLs have different criteria for including IP addresses. 
They list one or more records of verified spam services, 
unsolicited bulk e-mail sources, 3rd party exploits like 
proxies, open relays, mail servers that have a high spam-to-
legitimate-mail ratio or IP addresses of hosts which do not 
reply to (DNSBLs maintainer’s) test e-mails [9,10,11,12]. 
Similarly they have different ways of categorizing these IP 
addresses. Some DNSBLs use different domains (called query 
domains) to separate IP addresses based on the reasons they 
are blacklisted. One domain may contain IP addresses for 
known spammers while other contains open relays. DNSBLs 
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return a reason code for a DNSBL query (e.g.127.0.0.2-6). 
Even if all the IP addresses have been listed in one domain, 
the reason code will explain what kind of spammer it is. For 
example, a code of 127.0.0.2 might represent a verified 
spammer, while a code of 127.0.0.4 might represent illegal 3rd 
party exploits (e.g. proxies) [10]. This type of categorization 
allows a service provider to go for particular service it needs. 
The delisting process of the DNSBLs varies widely: Some 
wait for proper de-listing requests, some use automated expiry 
timer and others wait until spamming is halted completely. In 
general the DNSBL maintainers mostly look for accountability 
from the administrator of the IP address, who has to request 
and respond to a de-listing message, before delisting him. 
When an ISP (Internet Service Provider) is blacklisted, so 
are all the clients associated with that ISP. Thus, numerous 
clients can be potentially affected due to a handful of 
spammers. DNSBLs are not faultless. Some maintainers list e-
mail sources without thorough investigations, while others 
simply are not efficient enough to catch majority of the 
spammers. Some DNSBLs are not updated frequently enough 
to maintain a continued effectiveness. The latency period (lag 
time between the spammer spamming and the administrator 
identifying them) can give ample time for the spammers to 
send millions of e-mails. 
 
E. DNSBL Query 
A recipient MTA or MUA can use its local BL cache or 
query one or more global DNSBL’s databases in real-time to 
filter out the spam. DNSBL sites use the DNS protocol to 
accept queries and provide replies. Typically a mail server will 
construct a special DNS query including the address of the 
incoming SMTP connection, and kill the connection if the 
DNSBLs server returns a special IP address (reason code) 
implying that the sender is in their list. DNSBL client can be 
built into MTA or can be a separate program which will 
automatically query a DNSBL site/domain while filtering. 
Performing a DNSBL lookup of a  mail server located at 
1.2.3.4, involves a DNS query of “4.3.2.1.DNSBLs”. Here, IP 
address is reversed like in the in-addr.arpa mechanism [21]. 
As described in section 3, since each DNSBL has its own set 
of responses and their meanings, one has to be aware of these 
while performing the DNSBL query. 
 
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 3 shows the high level architecture of the e-mail 
system with the cache implementation. The local caches are 
initially empty and they get filled up depending on the 
responses of the DNSBL queries. The IP addresses are first 
compared to the list in the local caches. If a sender is on the 
WL, further searches in the BL cache and an external DNSBL 
query is not required; it will be sent directly to the user’s mail 
box.  However, if it is not found in the WL cache, the entry is 
searched at the BL cache; if it is found here, the e-mail is 
rejected or dropped or returned. If the IP address is not found 
in the caches, an external DNSBL query is carried out with 
that IP address to determine if it is listed or not in one or more 
DNSBLs. In our work, the DNSBL query has been carried out 
using the popular DNSBLs [15]. An IP address is added to the 
WL cache  for all ‘false’ or negative responses from the 
DNSBL and to the BL cache for all ‘true’ or positive 
responses.  
The journey of an incoming e-mail (from the time it enters 
the mail server to the time it is listed in the cache) in our 
design is shown by the flow chart in Figure 4. IP addresses of 
the senders and relaying machines are extracted from the log 
file (for the incoming e-mails to our mail server). The log file 
includes all the connection attempts to the mail server (both 
regular e-mails and the e-mails rejected by the local host).  
The cache search process is summarized below: 
 
Search(String  IP) { 
  SearchWLcache(String  IP){} 
    (if !foundInWLcache) { 
      SearchBLcache(String IP){} 
         { (if !foundInBLcache) 
              QueryDNSBL (String IP){ 
                     if( response = positive) write to the BLcache; 
                    if( response = negative) write to the WLcache; 
               } 
         } 
    } 
} 
 
 
Fig. 3: E-mail system with Cache Implementation for Spam Control 
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Fig. 4: Flow Chart of Cache Implementation for Spam Control 
 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The simulation code was developed in JCreator IDE and 
compiled with JDK1.5. The program reads and compares the 
data set (IP addresses as string data type) with those that in 
the local caches. The sender’s IP addresses are extracted in a 
chronological order from the e-mail log. WL and BL caches 
are implemented using the secondary (hard drive) memory. 
InetAddress class from the package java.net provides the 
method to resolve host names to their IP addresses and vice 
versa. Ordered or sorted list for the cache and the 
implementation of efficient list search algorithms are not used 
because we are focusing our work on the network traffic only. 
Also the latency affect is not considered for a simple reason 
that different computers run with different speed. 
A batch (for the simulation purpose) is defined as the total 
number of IP addresses (test data) sent for the DNSBL query 
in a single run/execution of the code. Table 1 lists the 
DNSBLs used for the simulation purpose. Combined zone 
(domain) in a particular DNSBL are used wherever possible so 
that they reduce the number of queries required. The tests are 
carried out within a week of the collection of the IP addresses 
from the log file.  
 All the (external) senders attempting a connection to our 
department’s mail server were considered. We did not use the 
incoming e-mails from of the mail server users. It was 
discovered that around a half of the total connection attempts 
were made from unique machines. 
 
Table 1: List of DNSBLs used for the Simulation 
Test   
No. DNSBL used DNSBL query 
1 
zen.spamhaus.org 
list.dsbl.org 
dnsbl.sorbs.net 
bl.spamcop.net 
t1.dnsbl.net.au 
no-more-
funn.moensted.dk 
cbl.abuseat.org 
dnsbl.tqmcube.com 
Individually 
queried to each server 
2-4 
zen.spamhaus.org 
list.dsbl.org 
dnsbl.sorbs.net 
bl.spamcop.net 
Simultaneously 
queried to all servers 
5 Same as in Test 1 Simultaneously queried to all servers 
6 Same as in Test 2 Simultaneously queried to all servers 
 
Test 1: Aggressiveness of the DNSBLs 
 
Fig. 5: Different DNSBL’s query hits to miss ratio, compared with the 
senders in the same e-mail traffic. Senders IP addresses were collected during 
a work day in March (2007) 
 
Figure 5 shows how the coverage of each DNSBL varies: 
there are some highly conservative lists (2, 4, and 7) which list 
much fewer spam sources than other aggressive lists. The 
number and the type of spam sources each domain lists vary 
widely. While some DNSBLs overlap known spam sources, 
open relay lists and other categories, others have a separate list 
for each of them. The results of these DNSBL queries (hits 
and misses) for the same dataset, change with time because of 
Responses of different DNSBLs to the DNSBL 
query for the same e-mail traffic
0
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7
7
Test 6: Total Cache Hits 
 
We collected senders (IP addresses) from a total of five 
day’s connection attempts made to our mail server (around 
120,000 unique senders) and tested them all in a single batch. 
Four DNSBLs were used and the total hit percentage in the 
local caches was found to be 75.27%. This reiterates the fact 
that with the local cache implementation, around three 
quarters of total connection attempts can be resolved locally 
(for concluding if an incoming e-mail is a spam or not).  
Preliminary results from the data collected from a different 
e-mail log/mail server, shows a higher percentage (>80%) of 
cache hits. This is possibly due to a greater spam attack on this 
server and large number of e-mails sent from the same 
sources. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Our results have shown how the cache implementation 
lessens the overall requests and responses that need to travel 
over a network for the DNSBL resolution. This factor, along 
with the apparent reduction in the search time for locating the 
source of an e-mail in the local caches compared to that over 
the network, can be quite significant for a large e-mail traffic. 
We also have a better control over the cache entries, which 
can be updated or modified as per our requirements.  
To increase the practicality of the tests discussed, they 
should be carried out with the logs from different mail servers 
and (the data tested) soon after they are generated. Catching 
every single spam source is not possible, thus, the focus 
should be to find ways to catch most of them. The number of 
DNSBLs used, affect the probability of a spam source being 
caught (also the number of hits at the local caches). While a 
higher number of DNSBLs protects a mail server better (same 
with the number of spam filters), we face trade-offs among the 
security, the cost and the speed. Only at the expense of 
resources and latency, greater number of spam sources are 
caught. A massive cache size is also not advisable; the search 
time at the cache can increase enormously. The entries in the 
caches also need to be updated frequently (listing and delisting 
of the IP addresses). Selection of DNSBLs to be used would 
be dependant on the kind of service the administrator wants.  
As a continuation of this work, we plan to use e-mail logs 
from at least three mail servers (for a comparative analysis) 
and work on the mechanisms to update the local cache lists 
regularly (for increasing the verifiability of the lists -similar to 
what some DNSBLs do). Faster tools (e.g. VHDL) for 
simulating the results would be used. Though the latency 
effect is hard to measure (because of the varying speeds of the 
computers) some experimentations with the search time will 
be attempted. 
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